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Information and communication technologies (ICT), like all technologies, are catalysts 
for political change and potential conflict.  The “Internet effect” continues to fuel the 
explosive growth of ICT, and has enduring implications.  It has sparked the long fuse of 
an Information Revolution—and a Social Network Revolution.  This revolutionary wave 
is fundamentally altering both the structure of institutional arrangements and the behavior 
of bureaucratic organizations by transforming traditional tactics for organizing, 
communicating, collaborating, and participating in the political system.  Does the 
accelerated rate of systemic change caused by the Internet effect create social cohesion, 
or cleavages that may lead to increased conflict?  The purpose of this study is to 
determine, by qualitative as well as quantitative means, whether a causal relationship 
exists between the degree a society is connected via social media networks (Internet and 
the World Wide Web [WWW]) and the institutional capacities of central governance. 
Blending theory with data, a statistical regression model is developed to evaluate the 
degree and measure the magnitude of this relationship.  The findings gleaned from this 
analysis suggest that a conditional causal relationship does exist between social 
connectivity and state capacity.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A mentor once casually stated during a lecture that with every new technology, a 
new political sociology is created and perpetuated. In the 21st century era of globalism, a 
new electronic sociology forged by digital network relationships has emerged in its own 
virtual spatial commons made up of data, bits, and bytes. Such affordable technology 
continues to instantly bring the world together in the palm of one’s hand in milliseconds 
as well as nanoseconds with readily accessible intellectual resources, knowledge, and 
tools necessary for modern innovation and rapid adaptation. As the virtual social space 
meshes with the geographic political space, it creates dynamic tension that places stress 
on political structures that comprise a value-coordinated and orientated social system. It 
has compelled academics and policymakers alike to study the expanding phenomenon of 
the “Internet effect” and reevaluate the role of technology—specifically information and 
communication technologies (ICT)—on the complex of institutional arrangements that 
serve as the central organs of both state and society.     
The purpose of this thesis is to answer one scientific question: Does a causal 
relationship exist between the degree a society is connected via social media and digital 
communication networks (Internet and the World Wide Web [WWW]), and the 
institutional capacity of state governance? Attempting to quantitatively answer this 
question within the empirical dimensions of capacity measured by tax collection as a 
function of connectivity measured by public access to social media over time is an 
endeavor to understand and explain the role information and communication technologies 
play in either the growth or decay of a regime’s institutional efficiency. Specifically, the 
maximization in addition to the realization of the state’s ability to project aggregate 
strength, to impose will, and to exert influence required in a constant struggle to retain its 
political authority, sustain its legitimacy, and maintain its sovereignty. 
My initial hypothesis posits that, as a liberal society becomes more connected to 
the Internet over time, the regime develops growing institutional capacity. Conversely, as 
a society under authoritarian rule becomes more connected to the Internet over time, the 
regime experiences decay in its institutional capacity to govern. Paradoxically, 
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information and communication technologies that have generated progressive 
modernization and social development may also facilitate the concentration of power and 
political resources.  Yet ICT have also simultaneously generated transformation by 
accelerating the dispersion of power deepening the competition for political resources. 
There is an abundance of theoretical literature, coupled with empirical data, to suggest 
that the role of technology is double-edged; historically, it has and continues to 
disintegrate crosscutting structural lines of polity that delineate the bounds of institutions 
of power.   
The methodology that I will employ in this thesis will be a blending of theoretical 
and empirical analysis. By design, this methodological approach serves to mutually 
reinforce and refine the dimensions of a functional, practical model that represents the 
cornerstone of this study. The theoretical analysis is a comprehensive study of key bodies 
of knowledge that explore the areas of organizational behavior, design theory, and 
political sociology. These specific bodies of literature are to be further discussed in a later 
section in detail. The focus of this thesis will be concentrated on the empirical analysis of 
compiled statistical data of both liberal and authoritarian regime types. This analysis will 
consist of the collection, interpretation, and evaluation of data that measures the capacity 
of a regime to collect a percentage or ratio of national taxable revenue proportionate to its 
socioeconomic development. It will also consist of the collection, interpretation, and 
objective evaluation of data that measures the degree or level of public access to the 
Internet by the given population of a particular regime type. A correlational analysis will 
then be applied to the dependent variable (state capacity) in conjunction with the 
independent variable (social connectivity via Internet) to analyze the significance of the 
causal effect on governance.   
This study aims to make a contribution to the evolving literature pertaining to the 
role of technology and how it affects the efficacy of governance. An analysis of the 
empirical data will determine whether strong corollary evidence and significant findings 
would suggest that a causal relationship exists between state capacity and social 
connectivity. The scope and relevance of this proposed study has implications that extend 
well beyond the model designed around the theoretical framework and empirical data 
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used to substantiate or negate this proposed claim. Moreover, it is to illuminate for 
academics and policymakers how the role of information and communication 
technologies serve as actual or potential catalysts that transform or modernize liberal and 
authoritarian regime types; and their ability to cope by means of liberal toleration or 
traditional repression with the disruptive changes imposed by innovative technologies on 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The significance of a causal relationship between state capacity and social 
connectivity could not be more relevant in a modern era of globalism that is testing the 
efficiency of institutions that exercise power, will, and influence. Although the role of 
information and communication technologies (ICT) in terms of unique technological 
innovations may evolve through time, their profound impact on social dynamics, 
institutional structures, and bureaucratic organizations is as integral as the liberal tradition 
of social science. The advent of modern mass communication platforms such as the 
Internet, coupled with instant access to social network information highways such as the 
World Wide Web (WWW), are emergent social phenomena that have linked billions 
around the globe in just the past two decades. Although many perceive these phenomena 
to pose unprecedented complex problems in the present, there are volumes in abundance 
of historical, theoretical, and empirical literature in the fields of organizational behavior 
as well as political sociology written over the past century to suggest otherwise. The 
following section provides a series of brief synopses of various approaches and methods 
authors have applied to elucidate the social forces and human behavior affecting the 
transformation and modernization of the state as well as the society.                       
More than a century ago Max Weber dedicated his life to academia in a quest to 
develop the structural-functional system. He was “absorbed in problems of the structural 
peculiarities of modern Western society, of the conditions on which it was dependent, 
and of its stability and tendencies of change.”1  It was “precisely in its differences from 
other social systems, in its alterations during its development, and in its possible 
alterations in the future, as an institutionally organized system of action, that Weber was 
interested.”2  The system he envisaged is a fusion of typological categories of rational 
ideals combined with conceptual models designed to capture the dynamical 
socioeconomic forces, movements, and behavior that propel institutions of power, and 
                                                 
1.  Talcott Parsons, ed., Introduction to Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 
(New York: The Free Press, 1947), 24. 
2. Ibid., 24–25. 
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compel institutional reform and change. Talcott Parsons’ translation to English and 
interpretation of the original German manuscripts lucidly expresses the necessity of 
Weber’s rational ideal types: 
The necessity of structural categories in the other type of [analytical] 
theory is an indication that the dynamic problems are too complex to 
admit of determinate solution without them, because there are too many 
variables involved, or because their nature and logical interrelations are 
not adequately known or are such as not to admit of the application of the 
requisite mathematical techniques of manipulation.3   
Considered to be the father of modern political sociology, Weber’s work has provided 
much of the modern conceptual architecture for explaining complex socioeconomic 
problems.   
One scholar who expanded upon Weber’s rational ideal types and fine-tuned the 
structural-functional relationships with a combination of comparative historical and 
theoretical models was Samuel P. Huntington. The focus of his thesis deals with the 
transformative impact of socioeconomic forces of change on social systems and political 
structures. Specifically, it concerns the implications of social mobilization and economic 
modernization on the rate of growth or decay of political power and order. The scope of 
Huntington’s main thesis argument postulates that: 
Social and economic change—urbanization, increases in literacy and 
education, industrialization, mass media expansion—extend political 
consciousness, multiply political demands, broaden political participation. 
These changes undermine traditional sources of political authority and 
traditional political institutions; they enormously complicate the problems 
of creating new bases of political association and new political institutions 
combining legitimacy and effectiveness. The rates of social mobilization 
and the expansion of political participation are high; the rates of political 
organization and institutionalization are low. The result is political 
instability and disorder. The primary problem of politics is the lag in the 
development of political institutions behind social and economic change.4 
                                                 
3. Ibid., 24. 
4. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968), 5. 
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From a historical context, this work was written during the post-World War II era of post-
European imperialism and neocolonial nationalism. At the time, Huntington was fixated 
on the emergence of second world absolutist, statist, and populist regimes budding up in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. As mentioned, his peculiar obsession was with the ever 
multiplying demands and complexities inherent to the social system, to include the ever 
increasing pressures and tensions placed on its state structure by liberal participation as 
well as political institutionalization. Perhaps the most prevalent theme throughout this 
work deals with the rationalization of political authority as a function of the distribution 
of institutional power throughout the system. Depending on one’s perspective, “one can 
thus define political modernization to mean either the concentration of power, the 
expansion of power, or the dispersion of power.”5 
Robert A. Dahl’s Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition builds upon 
Huntington’s theoretical model of institutional roles and structure in transforming and 
modernizing societies. His expansion utilizes a systematic approach and method of in-
depth subjective analysis combined with an objective diagnosis of optimal internal 
conditions for the creation of social polyarchies (pluralistic regimes types) that directly 
contrast with hegemonic regime types (social diversity). In conjunction with 
Huntington’s analysis of the distribution of institutional power, Dahl takes the concepts 
of power and function a step further by refining the interpretation of concentration and 
dispersion to mean the political monopolization versus competition for political 
resources, knowledge, and skills by both state and society. In terms of toleration or 
repression of society by the state: 
The key resources that governments use to suppress oppositions are of two 
broad types: violent means of coercion, persuasion, and inducement, 
typically wielded by military and police forces; and nonviolent means of 
coercion, persuasion and inducement, or as they will be called here, 
socioeconomic sanctions, chiefly in the form of control over economic 
resources, means of communication, and processes of education and 
political socialization.6 
                                                 
5. Ibid., 145. 
6. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1971), 48–49. 
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Furthermore, he also prescribes two guiding principles or axioms that establish the 
utilitarian value of institutionalizing toleration or repression, by describing how such 
political resources provide leverage to preserve socioeconomic order and control: 
Axiom [1]: The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases 
as the resources available to the government for suppression decline relative to the 
resources of an opposition.7 
 
Axiom [2]: The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases 
with a reduction in the capacity of the government to use violence or 
socioeconomic sanctions to suppress an opposition.8    
This qualitative literature thus serves to illuminate the complex character of the 
convergence of dynamical forces of society with structural forces of polity, reminding us 
that these forces of revolutionary change function both as an impetus of modernization, 
and also as a catalyst driving the transformation of social and state systems of 
governance. 
Classical scholars and theorists such as Parsons, Huntington, and Dahl developed 
the theoretical framework of comparative political sociology in an attempt to capture 
essential causal relationships underlying the conditions of systemic change. However, 
while their models have generated key insights, their qualitative analyses of contextual 
and behavioral variables fall short of quantitatively depicting a precise picture of the 
temporal and spatial dimensions of the process.9  Still, their contributions have paved the 
way for contemporary scholars and theorists to build on their models, thus bridging a 
significant gap between theory and data.   
This modernization and development perspective has formed the foundation for 
several important quantitative empirical studies of state capacity and governance.   Hegre, 
Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch develop an empirical model by conducting a multivariate 
                                                 
7. Ibid., 48. 
8. Ibid., 49. 
9. Concerning exposure of this empirical gap and data deficit, Almond and Verba highlight that “the 
development of statistical analysis [has] made it increasingly possible to establish the patterns of interaction 
among attitudes, the relations of social-structural and demographic variables to attitude variables, and the 
relations of attitude variables to social and political behavior.”  For more on the historical advancement of 
research design and methodology, see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture 
Revisited, 4th ed. (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), 15.  
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regression analysis to determine the statistical significance and magnitude of the causal 
relationship between the level of democracy and political change; and how susceptible 
certain regime types are to civil war or conflict.10  Their study focuses on the time-effects 
that political change has on intermediate regimes or semidemocracies that fall within or 
between the broad spectrum of democracy and autocracy.11 
In their quantitative study of preferences versus grievances, Collier and Hoeffler 
develop two distinct econometric models to determine whether the initiation of civil war 
results from a conditional series of opportunities presenting participants either financial 
payoffs and tradeoffs (greed), or whether the initiation is caused by personal motivations 
(grievances). Their main empirical model is premised on “economic accounts which 
explain rebellion in terms of opportunity: it is the circumstances in which people are able 
to rebel that are rare.”12  The frequency of rebellion, including occurrences of civil war, is 
regressed against three quantitative explanatory variables that finance such domestic 
conflict. In their first model, Collier and Hoeffler “consider three common sources: 
extortion of natural resources, donations from diasporas, and subventions from hostile 
governments.”13  Their second model utilizes “four objective measures of grievance: 
ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic 
inequality.”14  Comparing these two sets of results Collier and Hoeffler conclude that the 
                                                 
10. One of the key contradictions of political change and the democratization process that they 
highlight is that: “Repression leads to grievances that induce groups to take action, and openness allows for 
them to organize and engage in activities against the regime.”  For more on this claim, see Håvard Hegre, 
Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?  Democracy, 
Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992,” The American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (March 
2001): 33.  
11. Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch conclude in their empirical findings that “intermediate 
regimes are most prone to civil war, even when they have had time to stabilize from a regime change. In 
the long run, since intermediate regimes are less stable than autocracies, which in turn are less stable than 
democracies, durable democracy is the most probable end-point of the democratization process.”  See 
Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?,” 33.    
12. This empirical study analyzes conflict through a different prism taking a unique approach to 
measuring rationalization of preferences and grievances by opportunistic rebel factions or insurgents 
assuming they would assess payoffs and tradeoffs for engaging in civil war with the state symbolizing the 
object of value. See Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford 
Economic Papers 56 (2004): 563.  
13. Ibid., 565. 
14. Ibid., 570. 
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material elements of state capacity matter more than grievances in explaining the 
outbreak of conflict. 
Building on this literature, Thies expands beyond the premise that rebels and 
insurgents (individually or collectively) simply ignite the spark of civil war, and inflame 
the passions of the domestic populace with the aim of seizing a plentiful bounty of 
resources and consolidated power held in trust by the state. Previous quantitative studies 
have modeled civil war utilizing econometrics, and attempt to demonstrate the rationality 
of behavior over time. Such analyses conventionally prop state actors against non-state 
actors, and assume both competitors are striving to maximize preferences in order to 
yield a political profit. Thies takes a different approach and utilizes a methodology that 
serves as one of the main blueprints for the research design of this study.15  At the 
conclusion of estimating and simulating the model, his empirical findings suggest: “First, 
state capacity does not significantly affect the onset of civil war, while the onset of civil 
war significantly reduces state capacity.”16  Second, “with the exception of the oil 
exporter dummy variable, primary commodities play no direct role in civil war onset.”17  
Instead, “primary commodities work their direct effects on state capacity.”18 
This quantitative literature has taken great strides forward in quantifying the 
conditions necessary for effective governance, and measuring optimal or desired levels of 
state capacity. However, a theoretical as well as an empirical gap remains. Most of these 
contemporary studies place heavy emphasis on the role of material resources, revenues, 
and key commodities in igniting political change or conflict. This thesis will instead 
explain the impact of social connectivity on state capacity. What differentiates this study 
from its predecessors is thus a shift in emphasis from material resources and revenues to 
the intangible effect of intellectual resources, along with the associated cognitive tools 
                                                 
15. According to Thies, “primary commodities are a natural source of revenue for both rulers and 
rebels, thus they are a useful focal point to study the relationship between state capacity and civil war 
onset.”  For more on his methodology and model development, see Cameron G. Thies, “Of Rulers, Rebels, 
and Revenue: State Capacity, Civil War Onset, and Primary Commodities,” SAGE Journal of Peace 
Research 47, no. 3 (2010): 321. 
16. Ibid., 321.   
17. Ibid., 321.  
18. Ibid., 321.   
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generated by ICT, on state structures and social systems, as the world collectively 
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III. SYNTHESIS OF A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In T. Camber Warren’s Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the 
Production of State Sovereignty, he takes a unique approach in his study to observe 
through a different analytical lens the popular paradigm of domestic civil war and 
conflict. Warren posits that: “Mass communication technologies thus make it possible for 
a mass audience to be addressed collectively, thereby offering a nation ‘an image of 
itself…as knowable community.’”19  As highlighted earlier, Collier and Hoeffler along 
with Thies observe this paradigm through the lens of rationality in terms of maximizing 
the utilitarian value of materiel in order to seize an opportunity or capitalize on a profit 
margin. Warren contradicts these hypotheses by postulating that political change has less 
to do with the rationality of choice and more to do with the construction of thoughts, 
perceptions, and symbols that forge a common identity. His theory builds on the 
expectation that “we should expect that mass media technologies will strengthen 
economies of scale in the production of normative influence.”20 
Not by the Sword Alone marks a significant shift from the previous literature 
centered on rationality, to mass media communication technologies that produce or 
generate belief systems. It also marks a symbolic shift from the industrial age 
characterized by production and hierarchy of interests to an age of globalism 
characterized by expression and autonomy of ideas. Although his study marks a paradigm 
shift, it centers on traditional means and modes of communication, including 
connectivity. Warren illuminates this focal point by saying: “In other words, as has been 
shown repeatedly in experimental work in social psychology, political messages tend to 
achieve greater normative impacts when they are perceived to have been more widely 
disseminated. Indeed, this is precisely why mass media technologies—such as 
newspapers, radios, and televisions—represent such powerful vehicles for normative 
                                                 
19. T. Camber Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of 
State Sovereignty,” forthcoming International Organization (2012–2013): 15. 
20. Ibid., 16. 
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influence.”21  It is imperative not to overlook or be dismissive of “old” media and its 
immense contributions to the development of collective identities that advance stability in 
times of civil war or conflict; but consideration of “new” media animated by ICT is also 
necessary.                 
Robert A. Saunders’ Ethnopolitics in Cyberspace: The Internet, Minority 
Nationalism, and the Web of Identity exposes and narrows a theoretical deficit, dealing 
with the impact of ICT on institutions of power as our world progresses into a globalized 
21st century. As Saskia Sassen contextually frames it in Saunders’ book, “Digital space, 
whether public or private, is partly embedded in actual societal structures and power 
dynamics: its topography weaves in and out of non-electronic space.”22  As the 
proliferation of ICT continues to narrow the social connectivity gap at breakneck speed, 
what are the implications and consequences of accelerating the rate of change in state 
capacity?  Saunders offers the following explanation with regard to the social 
phenomenon of the Internet effect: 
All states have suffered a diminution of both internal and external 
authority in the face of the pressures of the global communications 
revolution, brought about by the magic combination of telephones, 
orbiting satellites, and computer. The overlapping webs of human 
activities which have resulted have served to erode the spiritual and 
practical bases upon which the nation state was predicated.23 
Moreover, how does it affect the process of monopolization of or competition for 
political resources in order to effectively impose governance?  The decrease in expected 
value and increase in cost of violent means of coercion generated by the proliferation of 
information communication and technologies (ICT) disintegrate structural bounds of 
political order; in addition to accelerating the process of dissolving the connective tissue 
of the greater social system that fuses the state to society.     
                                                 
21. Ibid., 15–16. 
22. Robert A. Saunders, Ethnopolitics in Cyberspace: The Internet, Minority Nationalism, and the Web 
of Identity (New York: Lexington Books, 2011), 57. 
23. Ibid., 56–57. 
 15
The convergence of dynamic social forces with structural forces of governance 
functions as a catalyst for transforming and modernizing institutions of power. However, 
in the process of reviewing recent theoretical literature on the subject, a significant gap in 
the literature is exposed that has yet to explain the impact modern ICTs of the 21st 
century have had on such institutions. Such modern technology has increasingly 
accelerated both the rate of socioeconomic development and political change. Expansive 
participation, aggressive competition, and rapid mobilization are currently transforming 
both state and society from a clustered mass to a constellation of bits. 
Saunders gives an important perspective as he expands the scope of this 
theoretical analysis from “old” source-based media organized around print, audio, and 
audio-visual to “new” social media oriented around digital network technology. The 
Internet effect has provoked rapid as opposed to gradual modernization along with the 
transformation of traditional state and social structures generated by ICT. This sort of 
revolutionary change ripens the conditions to create as well as escalate future political 
crises and social shocks that can destabilize the system. The implication of such crises 
and shocks is a disruption in the ability of the state to legitimate its purpose and to control 
all various facets or dimensions of society by imposing its will on citizens of the state. 
This disruption leads to degradation of the government’s capacity to realize its full 
potential to consolidate state power, rationalize political authority, and appropriate social 
relationships.24  Furthermore, contributing to this degradation in capacity, an increase in 
the level of connectivity of digital social networks weakens rather than strengthens 
traditional control mechanisms of the state apparatus. 
The institutional arrangements and bureaucratic organizations that compose the 
state apparatus are designed to reinforce cleavages within the greater social system. 
These crosscutting cleavages are reinforced by the state to politically define subcultures 
                                                 
24. Max Weber’s methodical approach to designing a theoretical model captures the essence (and 
nuances) of systemic behavior as well as dynamic variables that formulate rational ideal types categorizing 
complex institutional arrangements and associated bureaucratic organizations; for more on the concepts 
that formulate his model, see Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, eds. and 
trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1947).     
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that carve society along ethnic, religious, linguistic, and geospatial partisan lines.25  Such 
rigid lines serve efficiently to manage levels of political participation and social 
competition that can potentially spark combustible, socially active movements or inflame 
the passions of the citizenry.   
The essence of subcultures embodies the cultivation process of routinized 
behavior and habitual social relationships. They grow normative influence in addition to 
branding an established set of normative standards that are formulated and implemented 
through the processes of socialization, education, and professional specialization.26  
Hence, a disruption in the status quo of such arrangements can trigger a political crisis of 
legitimacy. Lipset points this out clearly articulating that: 
A crisis of legitimacy is a crisis of change. Therefore, its roots must be 
sought in the character of change in modern society. Crises of legitimacy 
occur during a transition to a new social structure, if (1) the status of major 
conservative institutions is threatened during a period of structural change; 
(2) all the major groups in the society do not have access to the political 
system in the transitional period, or at least as soon as they develop 
political demands. After a new social structure is established, in the new 
system is unable to sustain the expectations of major groups (on the 
grounds of “effectiveness”) for a long enough period to develop 
legitimacy upon the new basis, a new crisis may develop.27 
Thus, the inhibition or inability to legitimate the purpose and cause for conservative 
institutions and bureaucracies to exist can compel a change in systemic behavior and 
structure of the greater social system. 
This fundamental change in behavior and structure that is being stimulated by ICT 
ventures beyond the engineering of cleavages and culture. Facilitated and empowered by 
these sophisticated technologies, the accelerated rate times the pace of participation, 
competition, and mobilization of individual ideas in the form of self-expression combined 
                                                 
25. See Chapter 17 on subcultures, cleavage patterns, and governmental effectiveness in Dahl, 
Polyarchy, 105–123. 
26. For more insight on conceptual blocks and perceptual stereotypes that inhibit creativity and 
cognitive behavior, see James L. Adams, Conceptual Blockbusting: A Guide to Better Ideas, 4th ed. (New 
York: Basic Books, 2001), 8. 
27. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 
& Company, Inc., 1960), 78. 
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with a collective conscious is exponentially forging multiple webs of digital social 
networks. These networks are currently diluting or diminishing, while simultaneously 
perforating these rigid lines of governance. Furthermore, they are also transforming them 
into more porous ones, thus making the structure more transparent and observable well 
beyond contiguous borders.28   
As the strength of these lines of cleavage diminish, the central nervous system is 
exposed—the system of beliefs comprised of ideals, values, and common operating 
principles. This central nervous system formulates as well as harnesses the collective 
identity of both state and citizenry. Most importantly, it serves to cultivate the state’s 
ideological worldview and shape an ontological reality. Dahl presciently emphasizes that: 
“Any dispute in which a large section of the population of a country feels that its way of 
life or its highest values are severely menaced by another segment of the population 
creates a crisis in a competitive system.”29  Such innovative ICT amplifying the 
frequency and intensity of future political crises and social shocks is suggestive of a 
surfacing revolution. Samuel P. Huntington suggested that: “Revolution is the extreme 
case of the explosion of political participation.”30                                              
One of Huntington’s famous maxims is that: “Revolution is the ultimate 
expression of the modernizing outlook, the belief that it is within the power of man to 
control and to change his environment and that he has not only the ability but the right to 
do so.”31  As the twilight of 20th century industrialism has given way to the dawn of 21st 
century globalism, many strategists and polemicists suggest that another revolution is on 
the horizon—the conceptualization in data bytes expressed by the Information 
                                                 
28. Cleavages continue to demarcate the foundational cornerstones of social diversity in regimes to this 
day. As a cautionary note, the implications consequential to the thinning of these well-established lines by 
ICT that delineate social structures and political institutions could potentially disintegrate over time. This 
may yield greater cultural plurality, especially in democratically oriented regimes. This could set in motion 
conditions that may polarize then gridlock both the state and society. Consequentially, such conditions 
could give rise to more conflict and less cohesion. According to Dahl, “Obviously any system is in peril if 
it becomes polarized into several highly antagonistic groups. Confronted by severe polarization, 
competitive regimes are prone to collapse, to a coup d’état, to civil war.”  See Dahl, Polyarchy, 105.        
29. Dahl, Polyarchy, 105. 
30. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 266. 
31. Ibid., 265. 
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Revolution. The genesis of the Internet effect that continues fueling the explosion of ICT 
has enduring implications. It has sparked the long fuse of an Information Revolution and 
a Social Network Revolution that cannot be easily managed by liberal democracies or 
extinguished by authoritarian dictatorships.     
Another qualitative maxim Huntington posed concerning such phenomena is that: 
“The measure of how revolutionary a revolution is is the rapidity and the scope of 
expansion of political participation.”32  The first two decades of this century have been 
marked by the melding of man, mind, and ICT into a series of dynamic social networks 
that are both endogenous as well as exogenous to social and political systems. Individual 
as well as collective citizens of the state now possess literally in the palm of one’s hand 
the cognitive tools and resources to exercise with little restraint actual and potential 
power to effectuate the mass mobilization of people. This is accomplished with the touch 
of a screen or the click of a button or push of a mouse by distributing and disseminating 
intellectual resources worldwide via the Internet.   
This revolutionary wave is fundamentally altering both the structure of 
institutional arrangements and the behavior of bureaucratic organizations by transforming 
traditional tactics to organize, communicate, collaborate, and participate in the political 
system. Does the accelerated rate of systemic change resultant of the Internet effect create 
social cohesion, or cleavage that further leads to increased conflict?  The underlying 
theme that is interwoven throughout this thesis is to assess the implications and potential 
consequences of the role of modern ICT in empowering global mass participation as well 
and political contestation33; and to ascertain whether the system is approaching or 
approximating an upper limit in terms of state capacity.   
The central concept, as previously mentioned, is that with every new technology, 
a new political sociology is created and perpetuated in size and scope. This idea is not a 
                                                 
32. Ibid., 266. 
33. According to Dahl, “The lower the barriers to public contestation and the greater the proportion of 
the population included in the political system, the more difficult it is for the government of a country to 
adopt and enforce policies that require the application of extreme sanction against more than a small 
percentage of the population.”  The application of extreme sanction implies the conduct of violence via 
administration or coercion. See Dahl, Polyarchy, 27. 
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recent phenomenon corresponding with the introduction or implementation of new, 
innovative technologies such as the printing press or the iPhone. In Political Man: The 
Social Bases of Politics, Seymour Martin Lipset postulated well before the advent of the 
Internet that: 
To the extent that the lower strata have been brought into the electoral 
process gradually (through increased organization, and upgrading of the 
educational system, and a growth in their understanding of the relevance 
of government action to their interests) increased participation is 
undoubtedly a good thing for democracy. It is only when a major crisis or 
an effective authoritarian movement suddenly pulls the normally 
disaffected habitual nonvoters into the political area that the system is 
threatened. Thus neither high nor low rates of participation and voting are 
in themselves good or bad for democracy; the extent and nature of that 
participation reflect other factors which determine far more decisively the 
system’s chances to develop or survive. But the extent of apathy and the 
varying levels of participation of different segments of the population do 
clarify the underlying consensus and conflict within the political process.34 
State capacity is a function of either political activity or political apathy. Catalyzed by 
ICT, social connectivity is enabling individual and collective self-expression. As 
previously posited—and important to reemphasize—this collaboration is performed 
consciously within a web of social networks armed with the cognitive resources and tools 
to actively participate, oppose, and contest the traditional political order. More 
importantly, it is confronted with the challenges and exigencies of ever increasing 
dynamic complexities and pressures imposed on these systems to assimilate as well as 
accommodate new social strata. Hence, social connectivity may potentially be a forcing 
dysfunction that may threaten the state’s ability to effectively and efficiently govern. 
As intense participation and interactive collaboration levied en masse by modern 
ICT is compelling the political system to accelerate the process of assimilation and 
accommodation of this influential 21st century digital strata, it is concurrently inhibiting 
the progressive process of consolidating state power and rationalizing political authority. 
These elemental functions justify its purpose as well as its cause: to efficiently impose 
                                                 
34. Lipset, Political Man, 219. 
 20
effective governance on the greater social system (by traditional means of administration 
or coercion). Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, Gleditsch stress in one of their prime concepts that:  
Theoretically, consolidation can occur anywhere on the autocracy-
democracy spectrum. Those at either extreme can be consolidated or 
unconsolidated. Consolidated autocracies exhibit self-enforcing rules and 
institutions that prevent protest and other activities aimed against the state. 
Semidemocracies [characteristic of oligarchies or hegemonies] also may 
become consolidated.35 
The autocracy-democracy spectrum conceptualized by Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and 
Gleditsch is an excellent point of origin from which to define as well as explain the 
complex dynamics underlying the processes of democratization and autocratization that 
appear to ripen the conditions for political change and conflict. However, at this juncture, 
it is necessary to separate these main concepts and analyze the causal relationships along 
this spectrum.   
The initial hypothesis of this study purports that a bifurcation of divergent regime 
type behavior takes place over time between liberal democracies and authoritarian 
dictatorships. The hypothesis proposes that there exists a conditional causal relationship 
associated with the ability to maximize efficient state capacity and effective governance, 
and the degree to which states are connected to the Internet over time. More specifically, 
it is purported that regimes oriented toward democracy would—in theory—experience a 
nominal or marginal growth in state capacity and governance. Conversely, regimes 
oriented towards autocracy would—also in theory—experience an exponential decay in 
state capacity and governance. Why?  Although this study is not to be dismissive of 
certain regime types oriented toward democracy, the focus of the analytical lens is to 
concentrate theory on regime types oriented toward autocracy. 
The degradation or decay of efficient state capacity along with effective 
governance is a function of the orientation of the state structure, and the connection of the 
particular regime to its system of belief and values that define its reality. It is noteworthy 
to emphasize that: “Autocratic countries do not become mature consolidated democracies 
                                                 
35. Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?,” 34. 
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overnight.”36  Authoritarian dictatorships or autocracies oriented toward this side of this 
spectrum display a propensity to become more structurally ossified when confronted head 
on with the dilemma of high levels of social connectivity to the Internet. Social 
connectivity naturally induces rapid or accelerated rates political change that would 
potentially create a social shock or present a political crisis to the system.   
Hence, a predictable response from the regime would be to exercise greater 
control by hardening the institutions of power and bureaucratizing the political order as a 
strategy to prevent the draining away of political power which could ultimately threaten 
the legitimacy of the incumbent. Concerning the power and legitimacy of an autocratic 
regime: 
Political institutions also can be deconsolidated. Political change, whether 
in the form of democratization or autocratization, can create instability. 
The loss of legitimacy by the regime induces dissatisfied groups to 
struggle against it. If the direction of change is toward autocracy, the 
deconsolidation of political institutions, also implies increased repression. 
Repression by a regime without well-developed political institutions is 
likely to promote civil violence.37 
Thus, it is particularly difficult and challenging for autocratically oriented regime types to 
allow or accept an open watershed of social connectivity throughout the state. 
Consequently, ossification of the regime compels the state to concentrate its efforts on 
reinforcing and maintaining structure through existing cultural, administrative, and 
coercive mechanisms. 
What about liberal democracies?  Do these regime types oriented toward this side 
of this spectrum display a propensity to become less structurally ossified and more open 
when confronted head on with the dilemma of high levels of social connectivity to the 
Internet?  It seems plausible that regimes oriented toward the democratic process display 
a certain propensity to better absorb rather than deflect social shocks to, or political crises 
within, the system. Liberal democracies thus demonstrate a propensity toward being more 
oscillatory in nature, as opposed to becoming ossified, while also tending to be more 
                                                 
36. Ibid., 34. 
37. Ibid., 34. 
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tolerant of different social strata and less repressive toward them (especially over time). 
Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch posit that: “In the case of democratization, new 
and more open institutions take root and promote a peaceful resolution of domestic 
conflict. As time passes, these become more entrenched, and the likelihood of regime 
failure decreases.”38   
Democratic regimes tend to derive their source of power from the wellspring of 
their legitimacy—the connection to their system of belief and values that defines their 
ontological reality. Rather than struggling to control every situation or condition, 
progressive democracies develop a series of processes that cope with the dynamic 
complexities of sophisticated ICT and the Internet. Like all regime types, their essence is 
about striving to attain dynamic equilibrium, and the challenge in liberal democracies to 
strike a balance between liberty, equality, privacy, prosperity, and security. 
At the same time, democracies are somewhat paradoxical in that there appears to 
be an inherent contradiction to the conceptual ideal of democracy, and what it 
symbolically represents to a majority of people. Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 
note that political change is continuous and somewhat constant for both state and society, 
and both continually develop and progress over time. Coining the phrase 
semidemocracies in their case study, they provide the following cautionary note: 
“Semidemocracies are partly open, yet somewhat repressive, a combination that invites 
protest, rebellion, and civil violence. Repression leads to grievances that induce groups to 
take action, and openness allows for them to organize and engage in activities against the 
regime.”39  During this enduring and cyclical process, even the most tolerant and most 
open form of liberal democracy is, to a certain extent, repressive. 
The previous sections synthesized a series of conceptions that undergird the 
central hypotheses of this study. However, this framework now needs to be filled with a 
data structure, in order to corroborate the proposed causal relationship, with the aim of 
further narrowing the empirical gap that currently exists within this literature. 
                                                 
38. Ibid., 34. 
39. Ibid., 33. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL DATA 
The previous section covered synthesis of the theoretical framework. It provided 
the structural dimensions to the essential concepts and ideas behind an emergent causal 
relationship between state capacity and social connectivity. Now it is important to shift 
emphasis from theory to data, and analyze statistical data and groups of observation over 
a finite time period. The intent is to test with quantitative data whether these loose 
assumptions or broad generalizations are actually substantiated by evidence.  
This section serves to define our measurements for both the response (dependent) 
variable of state capacity as well as the explanatory (independent) variables—including 
social connectivity—within a time-series cross-sectional model. This approach utilizes 
multivariate linear regression to develop the main empirical model, and to formulate 
alternate versions used to test for model robustness. The aim of conducting this 
regression analysis is to apply the explanatory and predicting power of the main model to 
estimate this central causal relationship, and to determine how this relationship influences 
the performance of certain regime types over time.40   
The regime types of a particular state over time is derived from a dataset that 
compiles data from 1800 thru 2011 of regime types spanning from liberal democracies to 
authoritarian dictatorships that is maintained by the Polity IV Project.41  This panel of 
observations is measured utilizing a cardinal scale known as a ‘Polity Score.’  It is a scale 
that “captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 
                                                 
40. According to Yaffee, panel data analysis “endows regression analysis with both a spatial and 
temporal dimension.  ‘The spatial dimension pertains to a set of cross-sectional units of observation.’  ‘The 
temporal dimension pertains to periodic observations of a set of variables characterizing these cross-
sectional units over a particular time span.’”  For more on the utility and applicability of this method of 
analysis, see Robert A. Yaffee, “A Primer for Panel Data Analysis,” eds. Kate Monahan and Jill Hochberg, 
Connect: Information Technology at NYU (Fall 2003): 1–14.           
41. The Polity IV dataset “covers all major, independent states in the global system (i.e., states with 
total population of 500,000 or more in the most recent year; currently 166 countries) over the period 1800–
2011.”  For a more detailed synopsis, see Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., 
Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2010,” Updated dataset version 
2012 (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, 2011).  
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(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).”42  Our explanatory variable, 
Democracy, transforms this scale to a range from 0 to 20.                         
Our statistical model covers a 20-year time period, ranging from 1990 to 2010 
(with all independent variables lagged by one year to mitigate the potential of reverse 
causality). This period covers the nascent development of the Internet plus rapid 
expansion of social connectivity and digital media. Also, these two decades mark a 
symbolic transition from 20th century industrialism to 21st century globalism. More 
importantly, a 20-year time period ensures a sizeable testing space for running the 
multivariate regression analysis.           
The dependent variable that comprises the measurement proxy of state capacity is 
the relative political extraction of taxable revenue, commensurate with gross domestic 
product (GDP). Our response variable, Capacity, measures a state’s ability to realize its 
full potential to extract taxable revenue from its population. The data, measured data 
from 1960 thru 2007, is drawn from the edited case study Performance of Nations.43   
The independent variable that comprises the proxy of social connectivity is the 
log of individual access to the Internet. By definition, our explanatory variable, Internet, 
is the ratio of individuals proportionate to the total population of society that can access 
the Internet. The dataset that compiles data on variables measuring social connectivity 
and digital media is maintained by the International Telecommunications Union.44  To 
account for the possibility of a conditional causal relationship, our models will also 
include a multiplicative interaction term, Internet x Democracy as a key variable.   
                                                 
42. Ibid. 
43. Relative political extraction measures “the ability of a government to obtain resources from a 
population given their level of economic development. Efficient governments are able to meet or exceed 
their extractive capabilities while insufficient governments fail to reach expected extraction levels.”  For a 
detailed explanation of this dataset on relative political capacity and socioeconomic development, see 
Ronald Tammen and Jacek Kugler, eds., Performance of Nations (Landham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2012). 
44. International Telecommunications Union (ITU) collects “information communications technology 
statistics and datasets for 200 economies and over 100 indicators such as Internet usage and mobile-
broadband networks.”  Of these indicators, the primary focus will be on collecting/analyzing data 
concerning individual access to the Internet; for more detailed information, see International 
Telecommunications Union: Dataset on Social Media Connectivity (Geneva: International 
Telecommunications Union, 2012). 
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The dynamic interrelationship between social connectivity and regime type is a 
key nexus of this study. This relationship is to be examined by conducting a statistical 
analysis to estimate the conditions under which states achieve greater capacities to extract 
taxable revenue resources from their societies. More specifically, it is utilized to evaluate 
if the efficacy of governance is facilitated or frustrated due to increases in Internet access 
by populations within either liberal democracies or authoritarian dictatorships.   
In conjunction with both dependent and independent variables, control variables 
must be included in this analysis and explained in further detail. The six common control 
variables influencing socioeconomic development and regime modernization identified to 
narrow this empirical gap are: (1) Wealth (2) demographic diversity (Diversity) (3) 
religious diversity (Religion) (4) oil exporting states (Oil) (5) mountainous terrain 
(Mountain) and (6) population density (Population). The intent is to maximize reliability 
of the model, while minimizing bias in the results. 
The concept of wealth is to be defined as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per 
Capita, which measures the level of socioeconomic development.45  Accounting for the 
distribution and density of population46 in conjunction with mountainous terrain47 
features of a non-contiguous spatial domain measures “the difficulties faced by 
governments seeking to control large populations across broad and difficult terrain.”48  
Oil exporter is a “dichotomous indicator which equals 1 if a country derives at least one-
third of its export revenues from fossil fuels.”49  Finally, ethnic fractionalization50 and 
                                                 
45.  Data measuring GDP per capita is derived from Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, 
eds., Penn World Tables, Updated dataset version 7.1 covering 1950–2010 (Philadelphia, PA: Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income, and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 2012); see 
also Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone,” 21–22.   
46. Data measuring population is also derived from Heston, Summers, and Aten, eds., Penn World 
Tables, Updated dataset version 7.1 covering 1950–2010.   
47. Data measuring the percentage of mountainous terrain is sourced from Nicholas Sambanis, “What 
is Civil War?  Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 48, no. 6 (December 2004): 814–858.  
48. Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone,” 21. 
49. Ibid., 21; data measuring oil exporting states also sourced from Sambanis, “What is Civil War?,” 
814–858. 
50. Data measuring ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) sourced from Sambanis, “What is Civil 
War?,” 814–858.  
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religious fractionalization51 are included to “control for the presence of pre-existing 
identity cleavages in the society.”52  The six aforementioned control variables are applied 
extensively in current empirical analyses covering not only socioeconomic development, 
but also civil war as well as sociocultural diversity.53 
Our primary estimation technique utilizes ordinary least-square (OLS) regression 
with panel corrected standard errors. These methods are applied in conjunction with 
pairwise selection in order to best merge and align unbalanced panels or incomplete 
groups of observations within datasets.54  Panel-corrected standard error enables 
conservative estimates of the variance of the model, accounting for the non-independence 
of observations within each country, in order to mitigate the possibility of overconfidence 
in the model’s predictions.55   
                                                 
51. Data measuring ethno-religious fractionalization (ERF) sourced from Sambanis, “What is Civil 
War?,” 814–858. 
52. Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone,” 22. 
53. For more detailed empirical analyses and literature that takes an in-depth look into modeling the 
patterned processes of systemic behavior shaping conflict, crises, and culture, see Collier and Hoeffler, 
“Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” 563–595; see also James D. Fearon, “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity 
by Country,” Journal of Economic Growth 8 (2003): 195–222.     
54. Cross-time panel-corrected standard error (xtpcse in Stata) “calculates panel-corrected standard 
error (PCSE) estimates for linear cross-sectional time-series models where the parameters are estimated by 
either Ordinary Least-Square (OLS) or Prais-Winsten [Feasible General Least-Square (FGLS)] regression.  
xtpcse assumes that the disturbances are, by default, heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated 
across panels.”  Pairwise (parity of observations and panel covariance) “specifies that, for each element in 
the covariance matrix, all available observations (periods) that are common to the two panels contributing 
to the covariance be used to compute the covariance.”  For an in-depth explanation of multivariate linear 
regression analysis with panel-corrected standard errors, see Stata 11 Base Reference Manual (College 
Station, TX: Stata Press, 2009), 372–383. 
55. For a recommended detailed summation of Ordinary Least-Square (OLS) regression and its 
application to analysis of response and explanatory variables in determining a least-square fitted model, see 
G.D. Hutcheson, “Ordinary Least-Squares Regression,” in The SAGE Dictionary of Quantitative 
Management Research, eds. L. Montinho and G.D. Hutcheson (2011): 224–228.   
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V.  ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL DATA 
The results for the main empirical model (Model 1), to include the five 
supplemental models testing for robustness can be observed in Table 1 located in the 
Appendix.  
A.  ESTIMATION OF STATISTICAL PARAMETERS 
A sample population comprised of 2301 units of observation (country-years) 
collectively making up 140 groups (countries) of panel data was distilled into the initial 
baseline model. The dynamic variables were time lagged by one year in order to mitigate 
a chance of reverse causality. When observing the p-value column in the regression 
output summary, one notices that almost all variables (with the exception of wealth and 
oil exporting states) exhibit high significance levels of p < 0.0001. In other words, the 
statistical parameters derived from the data are generally estimated with a high level of 
precision. While oil income and economic development appear insignificant in this 
specification, this may be because these variables were already factored into Tammen 
and Kugler’s model of relative political capacity of developed countries.5657  
Further examining Model 1, one notices that social connectivity seems to 
negatively affect state capacity, thus solidifying the proposed claim of this study. 
Conversely, however, the interaction term between social connectivity and regime type 
appears to imply a key difference in how social connectivity operates within more or less 
democratically oriented regime types. This will be further discussed in detail as the scope 
of this process expands from the estimation process into the process of simulating 
                                                 
56. Tammen and Kugler’s methodology for measuring political extraction is contingent upon three 
differentiated models “that have been tested to account for levels of extraction [dependent] upon the level 
of development of a country as well as its particular mix of resources. Developed and developing countries 
differ quite sharply based on differences in the structure of their economies and their patterns of tax 
collection.”  For a detailed description of their three baseline models, see Tammen and Kugler, eds., 
Performance of Nations.      
57. As previously mentioned during the estimation process, the main concerns intrinsic to stochastic or 
dynamic modeling when dealing with pooled or panel data is addressing the conditions of serial or 
autocorrelation of error across periodic observations, heteroskedasticity of residuals, and multicollinearity 
of explanatory variables when considering the functionality and utility of the model. For a recommended 
diagnostic of potential problems inherent to data structures, see Jeffrey J. Harden, “Panel Data Analysis” 
(methods paper, University of North Carolina, June 29, 2009), 1–4.         
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predicted probabilities that systemically project the expected performance of states over 
time. 
Before generating simulations of patterned processes of behavior, it is essential 
that robustness checks be conducted to ensure the initial results derived from the baseline 
model were not a random occurrence or anomaly. While this output suggests a well-fitted 
model and a high level of scientific confidence in its explanatory and predicting power, 
the results remain suspect until robustness checks are conducted against them. These 
checks will ensure that such highly significant p-values are not the result of arbitrary 
specification choices in the estimation process.58 
B. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Five differentiated robustness checks for efficiency, expected bias, and 
consistency of results were conducted against the data, testing the foundational integrity 
of the baseline model. The first check removed relative political extraction of taxable 
revenue resources commensurate with GDP, and substituted it with an alternate response 
variable that measured relative political extraction commensurate with agriculture 
(developing countries oriented toward subsistence farming and/or commercial agriculture 
rather than market based economies).59  As can be seen in Model 2, of all six models 
estimated, this alternate model version yielded equally high levels of statistical 
significance as those reported in Model 1. 
The second as well as third check, respectively, adjusted the main model by 
incorporating longer time-effect lags. In both robustness checks, the GDP response 
variable was returned to the model as the dependent variable. The second model 
incorporated two-year time lags in the explanatory variables; the third model 
incorporated five-year time lags in its explanatory variables. As can be seen in Model 3 
                                                 
58. There are three potential types of [systematic] variance with this data: “Effects across units (across 
states), effects across time (variance across the years 1980–2009 for example), or effects within units 
(within states).”  For more on structural problems and unit effects, see Harden, “Panel Data Analysis,” 1–4. 
59. For the least developed societies today, Tammen and Kugler posit that “agriculture as a control 
variable has proven to be a more accurate descriptor of the economic structure of societies. Over time as 
subsistence agriculture disappears, and populations become urban, income per capita is a more effective 
reflector of taxable productivity.”  See Tammen and Kugler, eds., Performance of Nations, which outlines 
the three proposed economic models of developed versus developing countries.  
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(Two-Year Time Lag) and also in Model 4 (Five-Year Time Lag), both alternate model 
versions yielded virtually the same levels of statistical significance and consistency in 
results. 
The fourth check substituted the OLS regression estimator, and implemented a 
secondary estimation technique known as the Prais-Winsten feasible generalized least-
square (FGLS) estimator.60  This robustness check adjusted the model by allowing for 
first order autocorrelation of disturbances in periodic observations rather than 
contemporaneously correlated error.61  As can be seen in Model 5, the implementation of 
FGLS in substitution of the OLS estimator still yielded highly significant results for the 
interaction term between social connectivity and regime type, in line with the previously 
reported result, though the statistical significance of the baseline regression coefficient 
for social connectivity is reduced to a p-value of 0.087 (see Model 5 in Table 1).   
The fifth and final check on robustness utilizes a fixed-effects estimator. With this 
alternate model version, the control variables that are constant over time are omitted (see 
Model 6) because the model considers only cross-temporal variance. Again, almost all 
dynamic explanatory variables (with the exception of wealth and regime type) achieve a 
high significance level of p < 0.0001.  
C. SIMULATION OF PREDICTED PROBABILITIES 
The final stage of this multivariate linear regression analysis is a shift in emphasis 
from the estimation process of statistical parameters of interest to conducting the 
simulation process of generating estimated predicted probabilities. The primary 
                                                 
60. Beck and Katz note that: “Researchers who worry that their data may fall into one of the extreme 
cases of heteroscedasticity or contemporaneous correlation of the errors can check for these problems by 
examining the structure of the OLS residuals. Only if these problems are severe, and only if sample sizes 
are large enough, should researchers contemplate a more complicated FGLS estimation strategy. Those 
contemplating such a strategy must trade-off the potential advantages [accuracy] of FGLS against the 
disadvantages of inaccurate standard errors. We have not seen a TSCS [Time-Series Cross-Section] data set 
that makes it necessary even to consider this trade-off.”  For more on estimation strategies when conducting 
a multivariate linear regression analysis, see Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N. Katz, “What to Do (and Not 
to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data,” The American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 
1995): 634–647. 
61. Stata specifies that, “within panels, there is first-order autocorrelation AR(1) and that the 
coefficient of the AR(1) process is common to all the panels.”  See Stata 11 Base Reference Manual 
(College Station, TX: Stata Press, 2009), 373. 
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simulation technique to be used is derived from a supplemental software tool applied to 
Stata known as Clarify.62   
The applied method runs an iterative process of 1000 simulations on the statistical 
parameters of interest that were originally calculated mathematically and expressed in the 
regression summary table of the baseline model. These simulations establish quantities of 
interest based upon setting specified values to particular explanatory/control variables, 
while holding all other variables constant at their mean values. The results from this 
iterative process of converting statistical parameters of interest into substantive quantities 
of interest can be observed in Table 7. 
The simulations begin by setting the Democracy to a low value of 0 (0 signifies a 
low democracy level), then a medium value of 10, and finally a high value of 20, while 
simultaneously incrementing the logged value of Internet from -5 to +5. The predicted 
probabilities derived from this interaction between Internet and Democracy can be seen 
in Figure 1.  
D. PROBABILITY OF A CONDITIONAL CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP: 
Given these predicted probabilities, it seems likely that a causal relationship exists 
between the degree to which a society is connected via social media and digital 
communication networks (Internet and WWW), and the institutional capacity of state 
governance. Although the bifurcated results gleaned from this analysis indicate a 
conditional correlation between social connectivity and its influence on state capacity, the 
key unanswered question posed is: what is the magnitude of this causal relationship?  In 
other words, to what degree does social connectivity influence governance at different 
levels of democracy? 
                                                 
62. Clarify is a software tool “that uses ‘Monte Carlo simulation to convert the raw output of statistical 
procedures into results that are of direct interest to researchers, without changing statistical assumptions or 
requiring new statistical models.’  The main command prompt estsimp (estimates the model and simulates 
its parameters) applied by Stata ‘estimates a variety of statistical models and generates M simulations of 
each parameter.’  Each variable ‘has M observations corresponding to the M simulations.  estsimp labels 
the simulated variables and lists their names on the screen, so you can verify what was simulated.’”  See 
Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King, Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting 
Statistical Results, Software Versions 2.0 and Later (Cambridge, MA: Center for Basic Research in the 
Social Sciences at Harvard University, 2001).     
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This question was addressed by duplicating the simulation process described 
above, this time plotting the marginal effect of a shift from the 5th percentile to the 95th 
percentile of Internet, at values of Democracy ranging from 0 to 20, with all other 
variables again held constant at their mean values. As can be seen in Figure 2, another 
linear graph was created to conduct a diagnostic assessment of the magnitude of the 
relationship and the degree of influence. 
An analysis of the mean expected values of Capacity generated by this simulation 
demonstrates a diminishing marginal effect on state capacity that is correlated to upper 
medium and higher levels of Democracy. The results indicate that a statistically 
significant negative relationship exists between Internet and Capacity in the presence of 
low levels of democracy, ranging from 0 to 10, and then a statistically significant positive 
relationship exists between Internet and Capacity in the presence of high levels of 
democracy, ranging from 19 to 20. Between these two ranges, the effect of social 
connectivity cannot be reliably differentiated from zero, as can be seen by the overlap of 
the 95% confidence interval with the 0 or null line63 (see Figure 2). Thus, there appears to 
be a high probability of a strong causal relationship between state capacity and social 
connectivity, conditioned by the regime type.   
 
                                                 
63. This 0 or null line is linked directly to the Type 1 null hypothesis test indicating no causal 
relationship versus an alternate hypothesis test suggesting a causal relationship proportionate to a given rate 
of change—either in growth or decay—of regression coefficient values that is expressed in the baseline 
empirical model. 
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VI.   IMPLICATIONS AND PROJECTIONS 
Our theoretical arguments coupled with empirical data provide significant 
evidence that establishes the probability of a strong corollary relationship between the 
levels of social connectivity to the Internet and the WWW and levels of state capacity. 
State capacity can be observed in terms of the state’s ability to perform efficiently and 
impose effective governance on the citizens of the state within the greater social system. 
The autocracy-democracy spectrum as conceptualized by Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and 
Gleditsch is an excellent diagnostic tool that can be applied to best capture the theoretical 
assumptions and explain the dynamic complexities intrinsic to state capacity.64  The 
degree or magnitude of this relationship is shown by the behavioral performance of 
authoritarian dictatorships versus liberal democracies over a 20-year time period ranging 
from 1990 to 2010. The aggregated panels of observed data estimated and simulated by 
the model reinforce our initial proposed claim. Our hypothesis suggests a high probability 
of a bifurcation of divergent behavioral performance commensurate with high, medium, 
and low levels of democracy. The simulation of predicted probabilities clearly exhibits 
this bifurcation shown in Figure 1 of the main model.  
Due to constraints of time, the research design along with development of this 
baseline model aggregated and manipulated panels of data observing just one indicator—
the Internet. However, based upon the statistical significance of the observable 
relationships generated by the baseline model, the robustness of initial results does 
indicate the future need or requirement to expand upon this model, and further increase 
its robustness. This would necessitate the aggregation of additional time-series cross-
sectional panels that capture multiple explanatory variables such as mobile cellular 
phones, Facebook, Twitter, etc. An analysis of the statistical significance of this 
combination of multiple explanatory variables measuring social connectivity and digital 
communication platforms associated with ICT would boost the explanatory and 
predicting power of the empirical model. Furthermore, it would also better depict the 
                                                 
64. See Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?,” 33–48.  
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direction as well as magnitude of the causal relationship between state capacity and social 
connectivity over the same 20-year time period.        
With that being said, the evidence of this causal relationship implies that while 
political change and conflict may alter the levels of state capacity, ICTs also accelerate 
the rate of political change and conflict. Although the effectiveness of governance is a 
function of the orientation and conditioning of particular regime types, social 
connectivity is a function of ICT. Sophisticated and innovative technologies may be 
regulated by a particular repressive regime, but they will almost never be eradicated. In 
other words, technology creates new political sociologies. Political order requires a 
campaign of effective strategies combined with sound policies to adapt to and cope with 
rapid changes to structures, functions, and roles accelerated by such modern technologies.   
As globalism progressively drives our complex world at warp speed into the 21st 
century—and beyond—sophisticated modern technologies continue to exponentially 
increase the rates of social connectivity well beyond the cultures, societal cleavages, and 
contiguous geospatial boundaries of the current nation-state system. Hence, technology is 
testing the parameters or upper limits of state capacity. Established lines that delineate 
existing hierarchical structures and institutions could potentially disintegrate over time. 
This may yield greater cultural plurality, especially in advanced democratic regimes. 
However, in weak developing regimes, this could set in motion political conditions that 
may polarize then gridlock both the state and society, giving rise to more conflict and less 
cohesion. Either way, there is no going back: the ICT genie has been released from the 
bottle, and the acceleration of such dynamics is likely to continue. Moving forward, we 
must therefore carefully consider the development of tenable strategies and policies 
capable of adapting to rapidly changing technological innovations. Technology is a 
powerful tool created by the human dynamic, which manifests a latent paradox. In spite 
of this, the immeasurable power of the human spirit should never be underestimated. It 




This section contains the tabular data along with graphical representations that 
provide the design and structural framework of the comprehensive model. This statistical 
model provides an explanation of the concepts behind the conditional causal relationship 
between state capacity, and how it is affected by social connectivity. More importantly, it 
captures a conceptual snapshot of the systemic patterns of behavior and dynamic 
variables that influence governance.       
B. REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 1 is a statistical summary of the multivariate regression results, showing 
regression coefficients in conjunction with their associated panel-corrected standard 
errors. The table presents the baseline model in the first column and then five alternate 








Table 1.   Statistical Summary of Regression Results 
Note: Baseline model and robust standard errors are in parentheses; Asterisks 
denote levels of statistical significance: 
*p < 0.1  
**p < 0.05  
***p < 0.01 
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C. CONDITIONAL CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP 
Figure 1 is a graphical depiction of the conditional causal relationship between the 
log of individual Internet access (social connectivity), and the mean estimated value of 
state capacity. This graph portrays the simulation of predicted probabilities, which 
predicts the simulated patterns of states with low, medium, and high levels of democracy, 
as estimated by the baseline model. 
  
Figure 1.  Simulation of Predicted Probabilities of the Baseline Model 
D. MARGINAL EFFECT OF INTERNET 
Figure 2 is a graphical representation of the marginal effect of Internet (social 
connectivity), showing its influence on state capacity at different levels of democracy.   It 
provides a diagnostic assessment of the magnitude of the conditional causal relationship 
estimated by the statistical model.       
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